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Abstract
We present an overlapping generations economy populated by heterogenous agents
who care about their consumption relative to others and the bequest they leave
to their o⁄spring. In the presence of positional concerns individual saving and
bequest rates vary across the income distribution. This dispersion in the rates of
asset accumulation is the main channel for envy to impact the degree of intra-
generational wealth inequality and its inter-generational transmission. Our results
suggest that concerns for relative consumption might be an important explanatory
factor for the surprisingly low levels of assets held by low-income households and
the high concentration of bequests in the upper tail of the wealth distribution.
JEL Classi￿cation: D62, E21, H21
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11 Introduction
The assumption that preferences are independent across households is standard in the eco-
nomic literature, although it is not particularly appealing. Indeed, social scientists have
long stressed the relevance of status seeking as being an important characteristic of human
behavior. In our discipline, it has been long recognized that the overall level of satisfaction
derived from a given level of consumption depends not only on the consumption level itself
but also on how it compares to the consumption of other members of society. Though origins
of this proposition can be traced as far back as Smith (1759) and Veblen (1899), it was not
until the work of Duesenberry (1949) and Pollak (1976) that an e⁄ort was made to provide
this idea with some micro-theoretic foundations1.
Recent empirical evidence has con￿rmed the importance of preference interdependence.
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) propose a model of relative income to rationalize the strik-
ing rise in the employment of married women in the U.S. during the past century. Using a
sample of married sisters, they ￿nd that married women are 16 to 25 percent more likely to
work outside the home if their sisters￿husbands earn more than their own husbands. Ravina
(2007) estimates an Euler equation derived from a preference speci￿cation that includes indi-
vidual consumption and the average level of consumption of a geographical reference group.
Her results imply that the strength of positional concerns, captured by the fraction of the
consumption of the reference group that enters the utility function, is close to one third.
He⁄etz (2009) outlines a conspicuous consumption model where the income elasticity for a
good increases with its degree of visibility. Using a survey-based measure of expenditure
visibility he accounts for up to one-third of the observed variation in elasticities across con-
sumption categories. Charles et al. (2008) document important di⁄erences in consumption
patterns for visible goods (clothing, jewelry, and cars) across races. After controlling for
di⁄erences in permanent income, racial minorities spend about 25 percent more on visible
goods than whites. They show that accounting for di⁄erences in income characteristics of
the reference group explains most of the racial di⁄erences in visible consumption. Further-
more, di⁄erences in visible consumption disappear when they restrict their sample to older
households, suggesting that the relative importance of interpersonal comparisons decreases
with age. Finally, a growing body of experimental research (see Johansson-Stenman et al.,
2002, Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, and Alpizar et al., 2005), highlights the importance of
1The subsequent literature has often referred to this type of interdependence as ￿catching up with the
Joneses￿as in Abel (1990), ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿as in Gali (1994), ￿status-seeking￿as in Ireland
(1998), ￿jealousy￿as in Dupor and Liu (2003), ￿envy￿as in Konrad (2004) or "consumption externalities"
as in Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007).
2relative consumption. These experiments present the subjects with a series of hypothetical
questions regarding their choice among alternative outcomes where these choices reveal their
concern for relative consumption. Roughly half of the participants are willing to accept a
lower level of absolute income in order to achieve higher relative income2.
In line with this growing body of empirical evidence, we present an overlapping genera-
tions economy populated by heterogeneous agents who care about relative consumption and
derive a "warm-glow" from the bequest they leave to their descendents. Our aim is to study
the e⁄ect of envy on inequality. The introduction of positional concerns not only reduces
aggregate saving and the steady state stock of capital, but also induces individual saving
and bequest rates to vary across the income distribution, with rich households saving and
bequeathing a larger proportion of their lifetime resources than their poor neighbors. This
cross-sectional dispersion in the rates of asset accumulation is the key mechanism for envy
to in￿ uence the degrees of intra-generational wealth inequality and inter-generational social
mobility.
Focusing on stationary distributions, we present a combination of analytical propositions
and numerical simulations where several interesting results emerge. First, in general, con-
sumption, saving, and bequest inequality increase with envy, with inequality of bequests
increasing faster than wealth inequality which in turn increases faster than consumption
inequality. The latter always remains below the exogenous level of labor income inequality.
Second, income inequality for any given cohort increases with age. Third, the distribution
of inherited wealth is more unequal than that of wealth in general. Fourth, if the bequest
motive is su¢ ciently strong the equalizing e⁄ect of bequests (found in Bossmann et al.,
2007) disappears. Fifth, in the presence of status concerns economic position becomes more
persistent across generations.
The intuition for our results is best understood by ￿rst looking at a framework that ab-
stracts from interpersonal comparisons (Bossmann et al., 2007). In that setup, the possibility
to transfer wealth from one generation to the next increases average wealth holdings more
than the variance of wealth and as a result wealth inequality falls. Our introduction of inter-
personal comparisons into this model prevents individuals from adjusting their consumption
below that of their reference group and as a result poorly-endowed individuals choose ine¢ -
ciently low levels of saving that induce increases in wealth inequality and reductions in the
degree of inter-generational social mobility.
2A closely related stream of literature, the research on subjective happiness, highlights the importance
of relativity concerns as a key determinant of self-reported well-being. See Clark et al (2008) for a recent
review.
3Finally, we compare the competitive solution with the outcome under a central planner
that internalizes the negative impact of consumption externalities. When positional external-
ities are stronger in the ￿rst-period of life, as the evidence presented by Charles et al. (2008)
suggests, the competitive solution chooses ine¢ ciently high levels of ￿rst-period consumption
and therefore ine¢ ciently low levels of saving. In order to restore allocative e¢ ciency the
government can introduce a progressive consumption tax along the lines proposed by Frank
(2007).
Our results complement the theoretical literature that explores the relationship between
inter-generational transfers and wealth inequality. The seminal work of Becker and Tomes
(1979) stresses the equalizing e⁄ects of bequests: in a world where labor income is random,
bequests serve as an instrument for inter-generational luck-sharing within a family line.
Bossmann et al. (2007) ￿nd similar equalizing e⁄ects even when individuals do not pursue
an optimal allocation of dynastic income between them and their o⁄spring. These theoretical
e⁄ects of intergenerational transfers are in sharp contrast with the popular wisdom, as well as
some empirical evidence (Mulligan, 1997), and some early studies (Meade, 1976), that suggest
that bequests are an important source for the concentration of wealth. Our model, with its
emphasis on positional concerns, suggests that the equalizing e⁄ects of inter-generational
transfers decrease as the relative importance of the bequest motive rises. We show that after
a certain threshold bequests increase wealth inequality.
Our framework and results are closely related, and complementary, to those in Bossmann
et al. (2007) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008). The former abstracts from consumption exter-
nalities while in the latter each generation is populated by identical agents. The introduction
of envy in an economy populated by heterogenous agents allows us to explore fully the impact
of positional concerns on intra-generational wealth inequality and on its inter-generational
transmission. Our results cannot be inferred from those papers. We show that, in contrast
to Bossmann et al. (2007), bequests may increase the degree of wealth inequality, and in
contrast to Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008), consumption externalities may a⁄ect the steady
state level of capital even in the presence of an operative bequest motive. Our assumption
about the non-positional nature of bequests is at the heart of these di⁄erences.
The evidence on the degree of positionality of bequests is sparse, but their limited ob-
servability and their concentration on the upper tail of the wealth distribution suggest that
they possess important non-positional features. Along these lines, Moav and Neeman (2008)
model a signalling game of status where agents derive utility from consumption, status,
and a bequest, which they model as non-observable. The non-observability of bequests in a
4signalling game is equivalent the non-positionality of bequests in a model of relative consump-
tion. He⁄etz (2009) conducts a survey on the degree of visibility of 31 goods and services
ranging from cars and watches to medical insurance and education. Although bequests are
not included in his list, the closest expenditure item surveyed, life insurance, ranks penulti-
mate in terms of visibility, only ahead of underwear. The high concentration of bequests on
the upper tail of the wealth distribution is a well documented empirical regularity. Mulligan
(1997) estimates that in the U.S. the proportion of estates passing on su¢ cient wealth to be
subject to inheritance tax was between 2 and 4 percent in the period 1960-1995. The fact
that most households do not leave a substantial bequest is consistent with a limited degree
of positionality of these transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and character-
izes the competitive solution. Section 3 explores the impact of envy on inequality. Section
4 characterizes e¢ cient allocations and presents an e¢ ciency-inducing ￿scal package. The
conclusions are summarized in Section 5, while the Appendices provide some technical de-
tails.
2 The Model
Consider a closed economy populated by overlapping generations of households. Time
is discrete and in￿nite with t = 0;1;2;:::1:
2.1 Production
Every period our economy produces a composite good that may be consumed or invested.
Output, Yt, is produced combining physical capital, Kt, and labor, Lt. The production
function, F (Kt;Lt), is homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es the usual Inada conditions.

























where f denotes the production function in per capita terms and capital is assumed to
depreciate at the exponential rate ￿:
52.2 Households
Individuals live for two periods, "youth" and "old-age". At the end of their youth each
individual gives birth to 1 + n o⁄springs. At any point in time there are two generations
alive. The generation born in period t consists of Nt households indexed by i. Our agents
are altruistic toward their children, deriving a "warm-glow" (as in Adreoni, 1989) from the
bequest, bi
t, that they leave to their descendents. There are alternatives to this approach
on the motives for intergenerational transfers. Barro (1974) considers pure altruism, in
Abel (1985) accidental bequests arise from market incompleteness, and Bernheim et al.
(1985) propose a bequest-as-exchange model. The empirical evidence on the reasons for
inter-generational transfers is mixed. Nonetheless, the evidence reviewed by Arrondel et al.
(1997) and Davies and Shorrocks (2000) suggests that an important fraction of the observed
inheritances seems to re￿ ect some kind of impure altruism close to the warm glow approach
that we adopt.
Within a generation, individuals di⁄er in their productive endowment, li
t, and in the




. Speci￿cally, we assume that their labor
productivity is the realization of a stationary random variable that is identically and inde-
pendently distributed with mean ￿ l = 1 and standard deviation ￿l. The resulting distribution
of wages for period t has mean ￿ wt ￿ wt and standard deviation ￿wt ￿ wt￿l.
Let￿ s focus on the i-th individual born in period t. In the ￿rst period of his life he
inelastically supplies his endowment of labor, earning an income, wi
t = li
twt. The sum of his
wage income and inheritance is divided between ￿rst-period consumption, ci
t, and saving, si
t.














where we denote by yi
t the i-th individual￿ s lifetime resources.
In the second period of his life, the individual is retired. His only source of income is
the return on the savings he made when young, Rt+1si











































where ￿ < 1 is the subjective discount factor and ￿ > 0 governs the importance of the
bequest motive3.
In line with the growing body of empirical evidence on the importance of interpersonal
comparisons for individual choices, our key behavioral assumption is that the satisfaction
derived from consumption does not depend on the absolute level of consumption itself but
rather on how it compares to the consumption of some reference group. Following Ljungqvist
and Uhlig (2000) we adopt an additive speci￿cation for relative consumption; ^ ci
t = ci
t ￿ ￿￿ ct
and ^ di
t+1 = di












t+1 are the average
consumption levels of the generation born and t, and 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1 are measures
of the importance of positional concerns when young and old, respectively. As Frank (1985,
p. 111) points out, "the sociological literature on reference group theory stresses that an
individual￿ s personal reference group tends to consist of others who are similar in terms
of age". Consequently, our speci￿cation restricts interpersonal comparisons to individuals
within the same generation, as opposed to Abel (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008).
Concerning the relative magnitude of ￿ to ￿, one may take hints from the work of development
psychologists and sociologists (Coleman,1961, Simmons and Blyth, 1987, Corsaro and Eder,
1990) which suggests that interpersonal comparisons and peer e⁄ects are more pronounced
early in life. In the ￿￿rst-period￿of life, people work, ￿nd partners, raise children, being
exposed to, and therefore in￿ uenced by a wide variety of social networks. More direct evidence
comes from Charles et al. (2008) who, using US data and controlling for permanent income,
￿nd that Blacks and Hispanics spend about 25 percent more on visible goods than Whites,
and that this di⁄erential on expenditure patterns disappears for older households, suggesting
that interpersonal comparisons tend to be stronger in the ￿￿rst-period￿of life. In line with
this evidence, we assume the importance of positional concerns decreases with age. This
is represented by a simple proportionality factor on the relationship between the degrees of
envy in both periods of life, ￿ = ￿￿, where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, in line with the arguments
presented in the previous section, we model bequests as non-positional; our results remain
essentially unchanged when bequests are positional, but less so than consumption.
In addition, we place restrictions on the stationary distribution of productive endowments
to guarantee that everyone￿ s relative consumption is positive.
3Our results can be easily generalized to the case of a CRRA utility function.
72.3 Competitive Solution
Given the level of saving, si







































































subject to (3). The necessary conditions for problem (8) yield,
1
(ci
t ￿ ￿￿ ct)
=













t ￿ ￿￿ ￿ dt+1
￿




























Let us begin by characterizing the optimal behavior of the average household, i.e. the






















1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
Rt+1￿ st (13)
Using the ￿rst result, equation (10) becomes,
￿ ct =
1
￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿ st (14)
Combining (4) with (11)-(14) we reach the following choices for the average household,
￿ st =
￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))(1 ￿ ￿)




(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿ yt (16)
￿ dt+1 =
Rt+1￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿ yt (17)
￿ bt+1 =
Rt+1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿ yt (18)









We now use the results for the average household to characterize the behavior of the i-th
individual of the same generation.
From (11) and (19),
s
i
t [1 + ￿ (1 + ￿)] = ￿ (1 + ￿)y
i
t ￿
(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿ ct (20)
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(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)




Combining this result with (10), (6), (7), (17) we reach the remaining choices for the i-th










￿ ((1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿))













￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿













(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿




Consumption of the i-th household, (22) and (23), is made out of two components. The
￿rst increases in his lifetime income, while the second re￿ ects the in￿ uence of interpersonal
comparisons, and increases in the lifetime income of his reference group. As a result wealth
accumulation depends on relative, rather than absolute, income. When individual satisfac-
tion depends on consumption comparisons across households, as a growing body of empirical
evidence suggests, the relevant variable driving saving choices is the comparison between in-
dividual i￿ s income and the income of his reference group, relative income. The following
result follows immediately:
Proposition 1. In the presence of interpersonal comparisons, i.e, with ￿ > 0, both the
proportion of lifetime income saved and the fraction of lifetime income left as a bequest are









￿ ((1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ yt
(1 + ￿ (1 + ￿))((1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)))(yi
t)









Rt+1￿￿((1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿) ￿ yt
(1 + ￿ (1 + ￿))((1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)))(yi
t)
2 > 0 (26)
In the absence of consumption externalities, ￿ = 0, the saving and bequest rates are
independent of one￿ s position in the income distribution, as in Bossmann et al. (2007).
The introduction of positional concerns induces poor households to save and bequeath a
smaller fraction of their income than their wealthier neighbors in line with the empirical
￿ndings of Dynan et al. (2004) and Altonji and Villanueva (2007). The former ￿nds a
strong positive relationship between saving rates and measures of permanent income, while
the latter ￿nds that the fraction of every extra dollar of lifetime resources that parents pass
on to their children increases with income. These di⁄erences in saving and bequeath rates
are behind the impact of envy on the degrees of intra-generational wealth inequality and
inter-generational mobility that we will describe in the next section.
Finally, it is worth noticing that with quasi-homothetic preferences (and perfect capital
markets) saving is an a¢ ne function of income. This property of the model ensures that the
10distribution of wealth does not a⁄ect the aggregate evolution of the economy, although the
evolution of the economy along the transitional path does have distributional consequences.
2.4 Dynamics of the aggregate capital stock
Since aggregate dynamics are independent of the distribution of income, the evolution of the










From equations (27), (15) and (13),
(1 + n)kt+1 = ￿ st =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)












(1 ￿ ￿)￿ [f(kt) ￿ ktf0(kt) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)[f(kt) + kt(1 ￿ ￿)]]
(1 + n)[(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))]
￿ ￿(kt;￿;￿) (28)







￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 + n)[(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))]
< 1 (29)
It follows that the curve ￿(k;￿;￿) cuts the 45 degree line at least once, i.e., there exists a
positive steady state capital stock k￿ 2 (0;1), that satis￿es
k
￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ [f(k￿) ￿ k￿f0(k￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)[f(k￿) + k￿(1 ￿ ￿)]]
(1 + n)[(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))]
￿ ￿(k
￿;￿;￿) (30)
A su¢ cient condition for a unique interior steady state is that ￿kk(k￿;￿;￿) < 0, i.e.
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)f00(k￿)￿k￿f000(k￿)￿f00(k￿) < 0 at any k￿ > 0 that satis￿es (30). Notice that this
condition is immediately satis￿ed when the production function is Cobb-Douglas.
Let us assume uniqueness of the interior steady state k￿. Then it follows from (29) that
￿k(k￿;￿;￿) < 1.
Proposition 2: Assume that k￿ is unique. Then the steady state capital stock, k￿, is
decreasing in the degree of envy, ￿.
11Proof: De￿ne the function
G(k;￿;￿) ￿ k ￿ ￿(k;￿;￿)






























￿(f(k￿) + k￿(1 ￿ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿￿)
2 + ￿￿￿k￿R(k￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2 + w(k￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 + n)[(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))]
2 < 0
This completes the proof.￿
Agents in our economy save for two reasons. First, as in the standard overlapping gen-
eration model, young agents save to consume when old. Second, in the presence of inter-
generational transfers, agents save to leave a bequest to their o⁄spring. The ￿rst saving
motive is positional, since old agents care about their consumption relative to the average
level of consumption of their generation. On the other hand, the second saving motive is
non-positional. As a result, an increase in the degree of interpersonal comparisons, ￿, would
shift resources from non-positional uses to positional uses (i.e., consumption when young and
when old), leading to a reduction of the fraction of income saved and to a decrease in the
steady state capital stock. It is interesting to contrast this result with the existing literature
on consumption externalities. In an economy populated by an in￿nitely lived representative
agent Liu and Turnovsky (2005) ￿nd that consumption externalities have no e⁄ect on the
steady state level of capital as long as labor is inelastically supplied. Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2008) explore an overlapping generations economy under pure altruism. When the bequest
motive is operative, i.e. the economy is dynamically e¢ cient, consumption externalities do
not a⁄ect the long run stock of capital. In both models, households want to keep up with
the Joneses today and in every future date and, given this symmetry, the resulting steady
state level of saving is independent of interpersonal comparisons. In contrast, our framework,
by introducing a non-positional saving motive, opens a channel for consumption externali-
ties to impact the steady-state level of capital. Our result is related to Fisher and Heijdra
12(2009). These authors consider a perpetual-youth model with consumption externalities. In
their setup, an increase in positional concerns increases the generational turnover term in
the Euler equation, lowering the steady state level of capital4.
Remark 1. By inspecting equation (30), we can see that if the degree of interpersonal
comparisons is independent of age, i.e. ￿ = 1, and if there is no bequest, i.e. ￿ = 0, then the
steady state capital stock, k￿, is independent of envy, ￿. The intuition behind this result is
that saving would be only for old-age consumption, which, if ￿ = 1, exhibits the same degree
of positionality as ￿rst-period consumption.
Let us return to the general case where ￿ is not identically unity. At ￿rst sight, one might
expect that the steady state capital stock, k￿, increases in the relative importance of second
period envy, ￿. However, this conjecture is not correct in general. To see this, di⁄erenting























(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ [(f(k￿) ￿ k￿f0(k￿)) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿k￿ (1 + f0(k￿) ￿ ￿)]
(1 + n)[(1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))]
2 7 0 (32)
Remark 2: The ambiguity in the sign of (32) disappears when ￿ = 0. Thus, in an
economy without bequest, the steady state capital stock, k￿(assumed to be unique), increases
in the relative importance of second-period comparisons, ￿.
Intuitively an increase in the relative importance of positional concerns when old increases
the amount of resources saved for second-period consumption while decreases savings for be-
quest purposes. As a result, the overall impact on the steady state capital stock is ambiguous.
When the saving motive associated with bequests is absent, ￿ = 0, increases in the relative
importance of second-period comparisons, ￿, undoubtedly increase saving and the steady
state capital stock.
2.5 Stationary distributions
Along a macroeconomic steady state (where R and ￿ w are constant) we reach the following
di⁄erence equation for the evolution of the average bequest:
4In addition to relative consumption there is a stream of literature that models interpersonal comparisons
in terms of relative wealth. In this alternative framework "status-seeking" tends to increase the steady state
level of capital. See for instance Konrad (1992).
13bt+1 =
R￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)







Provided R￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) < (1 + n)((1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))); the average
bequest eventually achieves a stable steady state5. In the analysis that follows we shall impose
a slightly stronger condition which guarantees that all variances are well-de￿ned,
R￿￿ < (1 + n)(1 + ￿ (1 + ￿)) (34)





= ￿ b =   (1 + n)R￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ w (35)
where   ￿
1
(1 + n)((1 ￿ ￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))) ￿ R￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
> 0 by
(34).
Since by assumption the wage earned in the labor market and the bequest inherited
from the previous generation are uncorrelated, cov [wi
t;bi
t] = 0; it is easy to characterize the












Combining (35) and (36) with (21), (22), and (23) we reach the following means and
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A convenient measure of the dispersion of the distribution of a random variable is the
coe¢ cient of variation, i.e. the ratio of its standard deviation to its mean. Combining the
stationary distribution of wages with (35)-(40) we obtain the following measures of inequality,
5Notice that this restriction is the standard stability condition requiring that the rate at which agents
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Finally, we characterize the correlation coe¢ cient between the levels of wealth held by
two members of the same dynasty belonging to two consecutive generations, a measure of
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2 R￿￿
(1 + ￿ (1 + ￿))

































0. Finally, replacing (36) and (40) in (43) we ￿nd the degree of intergenerational transmission




(1 + n)(1 + ￿ (1 + ￿))
(44)
where s0 denotes the saving of an individual of the next generation that belongs to the same
dynasty.
3 Envy and Inequality
In this section we explore the impact of positional concerns on the stationary distributions
of consumption, wealth (saving), and bequests. We are particularly interested in charac-
terizing the impact of envy on the intra-generational distribution of wealth and on the
inter-generational transmission of inequality. In a ￿rst stage, we provide analytical results
under a simple production technology linear in capital and labor. In a second stage, we illus-
trate numerically the interaction between inequality and envy in a less restrictive production
environment where factor prices evolve as the capital-labor ratio changes with envy.
153.1 Linear technology: Some analytical results
Following Caballe and Moro-Egido (2009), we assume (in this sub-section only) a linear
technology,
F (Kt;Lt) = wLt + rKt (45)
Under constant marginal products, factor prices, which are independent of the degree of
positional concerns, are given by
wt = w (46)
Rt = R = 1 ￿ ￿ + r (47)
Di⁄erentiating (35), (37), and (39) with respect to the degree of positional concerns, we
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+￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ((1 + n)(1 ￿ ￿￿) + R￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
￿
￿ w < 0 (50)
An increase in positional concerns decreases the average bequest, the average level of
saving, and if the economy is dynamically e¢ cient, R > 1 + n, and envy is symmetric
through life, ￿ = 1, the average level of consumption. It is worth noticing that although
the propensity to consume out of lifetime income increases with envy (see (16)) the decrease
in lifetime resources induced by the lower level of inherited wealth more than o⁄sets this
increased propensity, thus leading to a decrease in average consumption.
The following proposition explores the impact of bequests on inequality under constant
factor prices.
Proposition 3: Assume the degree of envy is symmetric through life, ￿ = 1, and pop-
ulation is constant, n = 0. An increase in the importance of bequests beyond a threshold,
16￿, increases consumption, wealth, and bequest inequality. This threshold decreases if the
strength of envy, ￿, increases.
Proof: Equation (42) implies that the impact of ￿ on wealth and bequest inequality is
proportional to its impact on consumption inequality. As a result we will concentrate our
proof in the latter variable. Given (34),
@CV (c)
@￿
/ ￿[R(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿(R ￿ 1)￿ (R + ￿)]
This derivative is positive if and only if
￿ >
R(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿







￿ (R + ￿)
2 (R ￿ 1)
< 0
Remark 3: In the absence of envy, an increase in the importance of bequests, ￿, always
reduces inequality. To see this, note that condition (34) implies that inequality (51) cannot
hold when ￿ = 0.
Remark 4: For any positive degree of envy, the introduction of a negligible bequest
motive (i.e. a small increase in ￿ from zero) reduces inequality.
Now we turn to a discussion of the e⁄ects of relative consumption concerns on inequality.
In the textbook version of our model, without bequests or positional concerns, the degree of
wage inequality is transmitted into identical degrees of consumption and wealth inequality.
Under homothetic preferences and perfect capital markets, agents that only di⁄er in their
endowments of e¢ cient labor allocate identical fractions of their wage into ￿rst-period con-
sumption and saving. As a result the degrees of income, consumption, and wealth inequality
are identical. Bossmann et al. (2007) introduce a "warm-glow" bequest motive into this
standard model and explore its implications for the distribution of wealth. They point out
that "in constrast to the intuition and general perception" (p. 1257) bequests reduce wealth
inequality. This reduction in inequality occurs despite of the fact that parents do not pur-
posely compensate the luck of their o⁄spring in the labor market as in Becker and Tomes
(1979). In our framework, in the absence of interpersonal comparisons, both consumption
and wealth are more evenly distributed than labor income6. The intuition behind this result
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17lies on the impact on inequality of the introduction of a second source of income, bequests.
Since the stationary distribution of bequests is uncorrelated and more equal than the distri-
bution of labor income, bequests have an equalizing in￿ uence on the distribution of lifetime
resources7. Again with homothetic preferences the degree of inequality in lifetime resources
is transmitted into identical degrees of consumption and wealth inequality.
In the presence of positional concerns, several interesting results emerge. First, given
(48)-(50), envy increases the degrees of wealth, bequest, and, when ￿ = 1, consumption
inequality. Second, in line with the popular belief and contrary to the results presented by
Bossmann et al. (2007), our Proposition 3 highlights the inequalizing e⁄ects of bequests.
If the bequest motive is strong, a strengthening of this motive will increase wealth and
consumption inequality8. Third, if comparative concerns are strong, wealth (saving) becomes
more unequally distributed than labor income. This is consistent with the empirical evidence
summarized by Wol⁄ (1994) and Davies and Shorrocks (2000). As the last authors point
out, for developed countries, the Gini coe¢ cients for income range from 0.3 to 0.4 while
for wealth they range from 0.5 to 0.9. Fourth, since wealth is the only source of income
when old, our model suggests that income (and consumption if the importance of envy falls
with age) inequality for any given cohort increases with age as Deaton and Paxton (1994)
report. Fifth, in line with the stylized facts summarized by Davies and Shorrocks (1999) the
distribution of inherited wealth is more unequal than that of wealth in general.
Finally we brie￿ y explore the impact of envy on the intergenerational transmission of
inequality as measured by (44). Since dynastic labor income is uncorrelated through time,
wealth inequality is only transmitted through bequests and as a result when this channel
is closed, ￿ = 0; there is perfect social mobility, Corr(s;s0) = 0. As long as factor prices
are independent of envy, positional concerns do not a⁄ect the degree of social mobility.
Nonetheless, this is just an artifact of our restrictive technological assumption. In general,
status concerns will impact the steady state interest rate and therefore the degree of social
mobility as it will become clear in our numerical simulations.
7Bossmann et al. (2007) consider a second channel through which bequests impact the degree of inequality
in lifetime resources. In their model with endogenous factor prices bequests also a⁄ect wealth inequality
through the interest rate, a factor that we will explore in the next subsection.
8Kotliko⁄ and Summers (1981) decompose wealth into its lifecycle and inherited components. Their
decomposition suggests that the inherited component ranges from 46% to 81%. Davies and Shorrocks (1999)
conclude that a reasonable estimate for this inherited component lies in the range of 35-45%. These estimates
suggest that ￿ can easily exceed ￿ in the empirically relevant case.
183.2 Cobb-Douglas technology: Some numerical results
In the remaining part of this section we assume that the production technology takes the
familiar Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation F (Kt;Lt) = (Kt)
￿ (Lt)
1￿￿ : Then factor prices are given
by,
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)k
￿
t (52)






is capital per worker. Equation (28) becomes,
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(0;1), the steady state is locally stable.
As in our previous analysis we focus on an economy in its macroeconomic steady state.
We assume each period of life lasts for 30 years and the following parameter values: ￿ = :3;
and ￿ = ￿ = 0:5. For ease of comparison, we set the mean and the standard deviation of
the endowment of e⁄ective labor equal to one. Finally, in our benchmark calibration we
assume the strength of relativity concerns is constant through life, ￿ = 1, and we abstract
from depreciation and population growth, ￿ = n = 0. In the absence of interpersonal
comparisons, the resulting steady state choices for the average household are as follows:
he earns around three fourths of his ￿rst period income in the labor market inheriting the
remaining fourth, he consumes three ￿fths while young, saving the remaining two ￿fths. In
the second period of his life, he devotes two thirds of his wealth to consumption and leaves
one third as a bequest for his heir. The implied yearly interest rate is close to 2%. Extensive
sensitivity analysis suggests that, as long as the steady state is dynamically e¢ cient, none
of these choices are crucial for the distributional patterns that emerge.
Figure 1 summarizes the impact of envy on the stationary distributions of consumption,
saving, and bequests. As a benchmark for comparison the reader should keep in mind that
in the absence of bequests, ￿ = 0, the average (and standard deviation) of the distributions
of consumption and wealth are 0.25 and 0.125 respectively. As a result, in the no-bequest
economy the degrees of wealth and consumption inequality are identical to the exogenous
19degree of labor income inequality and equal to 1. Finally in the absence of bequests there
is perfect social mobility, i.e. Corr(s;s0) = 0. As long as we abstract from interpersonal
comparisons, ￿ = 0; bequests play the equalizing role highlighted by Bossmann et al. (2007).
Although the presence of bequests increases the standard deviation of wealth by 70% their
impact on the average wealth holding is always larger. In our benchmark calibration, this is
almost twice as large, and as a result, wealth inequality falls by roughly 23%. Taking the be-
quest economy as our starting point, as we increase the degree of positional concerns average
wealth and average consumption fall. Nonetheless, since envious agents resist decreases in
their consumption relative to average consumption, consumption falls at a slower rate than
wealth. Given the resource constraint, the slower decrease in consumption is neccesarily
accompanied with a rapid decrease in the average bequest as the weight agents place on
relative consumption increases. The fourth panel of Figure 1 reproduces the coe¢ cients of
variation of consumption, wealth, and bequests. As the importance of envy increases the
three measures of inequality increase, but they do so at very di⁄erent rates, with inequality of
bequests growing faster than wealth inequality which in turn grows faster than consumption
inequality that always remains below the exogenous level of labor income inequality.
In order to build our intuition on the impact of envy on these di⁄erent dimensions of
inequality Figure 2 illustrates the choices of two individuals relative to the choices of the
average individual for di⁄erent degrees of positional concerns. The ￿rst agent is endowed
with a lifetime income that exceeds average lifetime income by 50% while the other agent
is endowed with half of the resources of the average household. We refer to the former as a
"rich" household and to the latter as a "poor" one. As we increase the degree of positional
concerns our poor household devotes an increasing fraction of his income to consumption,
in an attempt to keep up with his wealthier neighbors. This reduction in the dispersion of
consumption is not enough to compensate for the reduction on average consumption that
results from the decrease in steady state capital (and output) caused by envy. As a result
consumption inequality monotonically increases. The downside of this "positional arms
race" (Frank, 2007) is a continuous decrease in the relative wealth of our poor household.
This reduction is especially acute in those assets that are accumulated for bequest purposes.
On the other hand, as positional concerns increase, our rich household increases his wealth
holdings relative to the average household. As a result, and despite of the fact that the
average bequest falls with envy, its standard deviation monotonically increases. Even for
relatively low values of envy, ￿; bequests become more unequally distributed than labor
20income9. As envy increases beyond this point the equalizing e⁄ects of bequests begin to
disappear and wealth inequality eventually increases beyond the exogenously given degree
of labor income inequality. For high values of ￿ bequests become very unequally distributed
inducing an increase in wealth inequality of 40% relative to the economy where positional
concerns are absent and of 20% relative to the economy where there is no bequest motive. The
resulting concentration of bequests on wealthy individuals, which in our model results from
positional concerns, is a widely documented empirical regularity (see for instance Mulligan
(1997)).
The e⁄ects of envy on the intergenerational transmission of inequality are captured by
the ￿fth panel of Figure 1. In the absence of envy, ￿ = 0; the introduction of bequests
opens a channel for the reduction of social mobility. Rich parents can transfer part of their
wealth to their o⁄spring providing them with a source of income which is independent of
their luck in the labor market. The impact of positional concerns on the distribution of
bequests exacerbates this mechanism. As the importance of envy increases, the distribution
of bequests becomes more unequal, with wealthier households leaving larger and larger be-
quests relative to poor households. As a result, economic position becomes more persistent
across generations.
The last panel of Figure 1 explores the implications on inequality of variations in the
degree of interpersonal comparisons with age. We set ￿ = 0:25 and we allow ￿ to vary
from 0 (i.e., envy only matters when young) to 1 (i.e., envy is symmetric through life). As
the relative importance of old-age positional concerns increases, inequality in second-period
consumption falls. Since wealth is the only source of income when old, this decrease in
inequality of second-period consumption can be achieved only through a decrease in wealth
inequality and therefore the coe¢ cient of variation of saving also falls. This decrease in
saving inequality comes at the expense of an increase in ￿rst-period consumption inequality.
Intuitively, as the relative importance of positional concerns in old-age increases, agents ￿nd
it optimal to reallocate consumption from the ￿rst to the second period of their life. The
rate of reallocation varies across the income distribution with poor households shifting into
the second-period a higher fraction of their income than rich households, as a result second-
period consumption inequality falls while ￿rst-period consumption inequality increases. In
9Direct evidence on the value of the envy parameter, ￿, is sparse. Easterlin (1995) and Frey and Stutzer
(2002) evaluate the time series and cross-sectional properties of several measures of self-reported happiness.
Their ￿ndings are consistent with preference speci￿cations that place half of the weight on relative consump-
tion. Alpizar et al. (2005) conduct several experiments to assess the importance of relative consumption.
In the case of cars and housing their median estimate for is between 0.5 and 0.75. Ravina (2005), using
individual consumption data, estimates a weight of relative consumption close to one third.
21the limit, when positional concerns are constant through life, ￿ = 1, consumption inequality
is independent of age.
Finally, Figure 3 reproduces the evolution of consumption inequality in a dynamically
ine¢ cient economy, i.e. our benchmark calibration with full depreciation, ￿ = 1. Since the
steady state capital stock is above the ￿golden rule￿level, a marginal decrease in saving
induces an increase in output net of depreciation. Since an increase in envy decreases the
steady state capital stock, the higher level of net resources is translated into an increase
in average consumption. As in the dynamically e¢ cient economy, the standard deviation
of consumption decreases with positional concerns, as a result consumption inequality falls
with envy. The evolution of the distributions of wealth and the degree of social mobility are
not qualitatively di⁄erent from those reported in Figure 1.
4 E¢ cient solution
In our economy, where agents di⁄er in their luck in the labor market, a utilitarian plan-
ner that gives identical weights to all the individuals of the same generation will transfer
resources from rich to poor individuals making sure that after-transfer income is equated
within generation. In general, these reallocations of income will not be Pareto e¢ cient from
the individual perspective and therefore such a planner behavior might be di¢ cult to justify
from an equity perspective. Furthermore Hammond (1988) and Harsanyi (1995) convinc-
ingly argue that the social welfare function should exclude any interpersonal transfers. As
a result, we restrict the role of our planner to reallocations of consumption that are Pareto
e¢ cient from the individual perspective abstracting from intra-generational transfers and
the dynamics of capital accumulation10.
The planner maximizes the following social welfare function where, given our previous

















i ￿ ￿￿ ￿ d
￿￿￿
(55)








10Issues related to dynamic ine¢ ciency in the presence of relative consumption are carefully explored by
Abel (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) in models where each generation is populated by a represen-
tative individual.
22where R and wi are the factor prices faced by the i-th individual of our representative
generation in the competitive solution since the planner￿ s problem abstracts from capital
accumulation.
Solving this program, where the superscript p denotes the planner￿s choices and ￿
i is the
Lagrange multiplier, we reach11,
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Since the planner acknowledges that each individual contributes to the externality by a
constant fraction of his consumption, the social marginal utilities of consumption include
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dj;p ￿ ￿￿ ￿ dp for second-period consumption.
Furthermore, since the marginal impact of an additional unit of consumption is independent
of the level of consumption, this adjustment terms are identical for all the individuals of a
given generation.
Combining (57) and (58) with (10) and (6) we reach the following relationship between
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Since positional concerns are higher when young, the planner reduces the private marginal
utility of ￿rst-period consumption by a higher factor than the marginal utility of second-
period consumption and, as a result, the private marginal rate of substitution exceeds its
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(1 ￿ C (ci ￿ ￿￿ c))
> 1, or equivalently the willingness of
agents in the competitive economy to increase ￿rst-period consumption at the expense of
second-period consumption exceeds the e¢ cient one. In the special case where the degree of
11We restrict to interior solutions, i.e. the ￿rst order conditions implicitly impose restrictions to guarantee
that the social marginal utility of consumption is always positive. These restrictions play a similar role
to the ones placed in representative agent versions of our model to guarantee that the marginal utility of
consumption, after taking into account external e⁄ects, is positive. See for instance, Liu and Turnovsky
(2005) assumption 1 (i).
12See the Appendix for a formal proof.
23positional concerns is constant through life, ￿ = 1, the private and social marginal rates of
substitution coincide.
Finally, as it becomes clear in the limiting case where second-period interpersonal com-
parisons are irrelevant, ￿ = 0; the size of the gap between the private and social marginal
rates of substitution,
1
(1 ￿ C (ci ￿ ￿￿ c))
, increases with income. This just re￿ ects the fact
that wealthy individuals, with their high levels of ￿rst-period consumption, contribute in a
disproportionate way to average consumption, creating substantial welfare losses for their
neighbors.
4.1 Optimal Tax Policy
Now we turn to characterize the optimal tax package that induces agents living in the compet-
itive economy to choose the e¢ cient allocation of resources between ￿rst and second-period
consumption. Since envy distorts the private marginal rate of substitution of consumption
the government can restore allocative e¢ ciency by means of a tax on ￿rst-period consump-
tion, ￿i
c. The revenues of this tax are returned as lump sum transfers, T i = ￿i
cci. The


















Under the proposed tax structure, we ￿nd the relevant marginal rate of substitution for
the competitive solution and we equate it to the e¢ cient one,
￿
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> 0 (63)
Since the distortion increases the willingness to increase ￿rst-period consumption at the
expense of second-period consumption, the optimal tax on ￿rst-period consumption is pos-
itive. And given that high income households contribute to a disproportionate share of
average consumption, the optimal tax is progressive, with rich households being taxed at
24higher rates than their low income neighbors. Frank (2007) proposes a similar tax structure
and illustrates its practical implementation using only income and saving data13.
5 Conclusions
We have developed an overlapping generations model where agents care about relative con-
sumption and the bequest they leave to their o⁄spring. In this heterogenous agent economy
we have explored the interaction between envy and inequality. The introduction of positional
concerns induces a non-degenerate distribution of saving rates that serves as a mechanism
that increases the degree of wealth inequality and reduces inter-generational mobility. Focus-
ing on stationary distributions, we have presented a combination of analytical propositions
and numerical simulations where several interesting results emerge. First, consumption,
saving, and bequest inequality increase with envy, with inequality of bequests increasing
faster than wealth inequality which in turn increases faster than consumption inequality
that always remains below the exogenous level of labor income inequality. Second, income
inequality for any given cohort increases with age. Third, the distribution of inherited wealth
is more unequal than that of wealth in general. Fourth, if the bequest motive is su¢ ciently
strong the equalizing e⁄ect of bequests dissappear. Fifth, in the presence of status concerns
economic position becomes more persistent across generations.
In the presence of consumption externalities poor households save a lower fraction of
their lifetime resources than their rich neighbors. On the one hand, this reduction in their
willingness to save, which is especially accute in those resources saved for bequest purposes,
seems to be the most important factor behind the surprisingly low levels of assets held by the
poor. On the other hand, the non-positional nature of bequests leads to a substantial wealth
concentration in the upper tail of the income distribution that allows wealthy individuals to
pass their economic status into future generations.
13It is worth noticing that we can use (16), (17), (22), and (23) to express the tax rate as a function of
parameters and variables that are exogenous from the standpoint of the individual household.
25Appendix
Proof of inequality in (59)
Combining (6), (10), (57) and (58) the following relation holds,
￿
di;m ￿ ￿ ￿ dm￿
(ci;m ￿ ￿￿ cm)
=
￿
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di;p ￿ ￿￿ ￿ dp￿
(ci;p ￿ ￿￿ cp)
￿ ￿R (68)
which combined with (64) completes the proof.
Finally, when ￿ = 1, since (68) holds with equality, consumption externalities do not
distort the competitive marginal rate of substitution.
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Figure 3. Dynamically inefficient steady state. 
 
 
 
 
 